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Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding
TL;DR. Civic crowdfunding, the process of raising voluntary contributions from interested agents for public projects, such as public parks, libraries, etc., has grown in popularity in recent decades. As these projects are non-excludable, strategic agents often free-ride, i.e., choose not to contribute. To address this, researchers have used incentive engineering to construct mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to contribute. This incentive is in…
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ASHWAChain: A Fast, Scalable and Strategy-proof Committee-based Blockchain Protocol
Appeared at: Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)Authors: Sanidhay Arora, Anurag Jain, Sankarshan Damle, Sujit Gujar Abstract. Most cryptocurrencies are practically limited, mostly because of their significant time to finality and lack of scalability. Moreover, most of the existing literature for blockchain consensus protocols assumes the miners as honest. The assumption results in the protocols…
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Designing Truthful Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits based Sponsored Search Auctions
In this work, we consider the contextual multi-armed bandit problem in the presence of strategic agents in the context of sponsored search auction. In this setting, an advertising platform (center) runs a repeated auction to select the best-suited ads relevant to the user’s query. The center aspires to select an ad that has a high…
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Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding
TL;DR. Civic crowdfunding, the process of raising voluntary contributions from interested agents for public projects, such as public parks, libraries, etc., has grown in popularity in recent decades. As these projects are non-excludable, strategic agents often free-ride, i.e., choose not to contribute. To address this, researchers have used incentive engineering to construct mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to contribute. This incentive is in…
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ASHWAChain: A Fast, Scalable and Strategy-proof Committee-based Blockchain Protocol
Appeared at: Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)Authors: Sanidhay Arora, Anurag Jain, Sankarshan Damle, Sujit Gujar Abstract. Most cryptocurrencies are practically limited, mostly because of their significant time to finality and lack of scalability. Moreover, most of the existing literature for blockchain consensus protocols assumes the miners as honest. The assumption results in the protocols…
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Designing Truthful Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits based Sponsored Search Auctions
In this work, we consider the contextual multi-armed bandit problem in the presence of strategic agents in the context of sponsored search auction. In this setting, an advertising platform (center) runs a repeated auction to select the best-suited ads relevant to the user’s query. The center aspires to select an ad that has a high…