1. | Sankarshan Damle; Moin Hussain Moti; Praphul Chandra; Sujit Gujar: Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding. 18th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI-2021) , Forthcoming. (Type: Conference | BibTeX | Tags: Blockchains, Civic Crowdfunding, differential privacy, fairness, federated learning) @conference{sankarshan2021b, title = {Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding}, author = {Sankarshan Damle and Moin Hussain Moti and Praphul Chandra and Sujit Gujar}, year = {2021}, date = {2021-11-08}, booktitle = {18th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI-2021) }, keywords = {Blockchains, Civic Crowdfunding, differential privacy, fairness, federated learning}, pubstate = {forthcoming}, tppubtype = {conference} } |
2. | Anurag Jain; Shoeb Siddiqui; Sujit Gujar: We might walk together, but I run faster: Network Fairness and Scalability in Blockchains. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2021), 2021. (Type: Conference | Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, fairness, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Scalability) @conference{Jain2021, title = {We might walk together, but I run faster: Network Fairness and Scalability in Blockchains}, author = {Anurag Jain and Shoeb Siddiqui and Sujit Gujar}, editor = {U. Endriss and A. Now\'{e} and F. Dignum and A. Lomuscio }, year = {2021}, date = {2021-05-05}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2021)}, abstract = {Blockchain-based Distributed Ledgers (DLs) promise to transform the existing financial system by making it truly democratic. In the past decade, blockchain technology has seen many novel applications ranging from the banking industry to real estate. However, in order to be adopted universally, blockchain systems must be scalable to support a high volume of transactions. As we increase the throughput of the DL system, the underlying peer-to-peer network might face multiple levels of challenges to keep up with the requirements. Due to varying network capacities, the slower nodes would be at a relative disadvantage compared to the faster ones, which could negatively impact their revenue. In order to quantify their relative advantage or disadvantage, we introduce two measures of network fairness, p_f, the probability of frontrunning and alpha_f, the publishing fairness. We show that as we scale the blockchain, both these measures deteriorate, implying that the slower nodes face a disadvantage at higher throughputs. It results in the faster nodes getting more than their fair share of the reward while the slower nodes (slow in terms of network quality) get less. Thus, fairness and scalability in blockchain systems do not go hand in hand. In a setting with rational miners, lack of fairness causes miners to deviate from the ``longest chain rule'' or emph{undercut}, which would reduce the blockchain's resilience against byzantine adversaries. Hence, fairness is not only a desirable property for a blockchain system but also essential for the security of the blockchain and any scalable blockchain protocol proposed must ensure fairness.}, keywords = {Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, fairness, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Scalability}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {conference} } Blockchain-based Distributed Ledgers (DLs) promise to transform the existing financial system by making it truly democratic. In the past decade, blockchain technology has seen many novel applications ranging from the banking industry to real estate. However, in order to be adopted universally, blockchain systems must be scalable to support a high volume of transactions. As we increase the throughput of the DL system, the underlying peer-to-peer network might face multiple levels of challenges to keep up with the requirements. Due to varying network capacities, the slower nodes would be at a relative disadvantage compared to the faster ones, which could negatively impact their revenue. In order to quantify their relative advantage or disadvantage, we introduce two measures of network fairness, p_f, the probability of frontrunning and alpha_f, the publishing fairness. We show that as we scale the blockchain, both these measures deteriorate, implying that the slower nodes face a disadvantage at higher throughputs. It results in the faster nodes getting more than their fair share of the reward while the slower nodes (slow in terms of network quality) get less. Thus, fairness and scalability in blockchain systems do not go hand in hand. In a setting with rational miners, lack of fairness causes miners to deviate from the ``longest chain rule'' or emph{undercut}, which would reduce the blockchain's resilience against byzantine adversaries. Hence, fairness is not only a desirable property for a blockchain system but also essential for the security of the blockchain and any scalable blockchain protocol proposed must ensure fairness. |
3. | Anurag Jain; Sujit Gujar: Block Rewards, Not Transaction Fees Keep Miners Faithful In Blockchain Protocols. Workshop on Game Theory in Blockchain at WINE 2020 (GTiB@WINE 2020), 2020. (Type: Workshop | BibTeX | Tags: Block Rewards, Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, Faithful Implementation, Game Theory) @workshop{Jain2020, title = {Block Rewards, Not Transaction Fees Keep Miners Faithful In Blockchain Protocols}, author = {Anurag Jain and Sujit Gujar }, editor = {Jing Chen and Xiaotie Deng}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-12-11}, booktitle = {Workshop on Game Theory in Blockchain at WINE 2020 (GTiB@WINE 2020)}, keywords = {Block Rewards, Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, Faithful Implementation, Game Theory}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workshop} } |
4. | Sankarshan Damle; Moin Hussain Moti; Praphul Chandra; Sujit Gujar: Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding. Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW@AAMAS 2020), 2020. (Type: Workshop | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Blockchains, Civic Crowdfunding, Ethereum) @workshop{Damle2020, title = {Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding}, author = {Sankarshan Damle and Moin Hussain Moti and Praphul Chandra and Sujit Gujar}, editor = {Sankarshan Damle}, url = {http://www.agent-games-2020.preflib.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/GAIW2020_paper_9.pdf}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-05-11}, booktitle = {Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW@AAMAS 2020)}, keywords = {Blockchains, Civic Crowdfunding, Ethereum}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workshop} } |
5. | Moin Hussain Moti; Dimitris Chatzopoulos; Pan Hui; Boi Faltings; Sujit Gujar: Orthos: A Trustworthy AI Framework For Data Acquisition. 8th International Workshop on Engineering Multi-Agent Systems (EMAS 2020), 2020. (Type: Workshop | BibTeX | Tags: Blockchains, Crowdsensing) @workshop{Moti2020, title = {Orthos: A Trustworthy AI Framework For Data Acquisition}, author = {Moin Hussain Moti and Dimitris Chatzopoulos and Pan Hui and Boi Faltings and Sujit Gujar }, editor = {Moin Hussain Moti}, year = {2020}, date = {2020-05-11}, booktitle = {8th International Workshop on Engineering Multi-Agent Systems (EMAS 2020)}, keywords = {Blockchains, Crowdsensing}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workshop} } |
6. | Sankarshan Damle; Boi Faltings; Sujit Gujar: A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders. In: AAMAS, pp. 1916–1918, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019. (Type: Conference | BibTeX | Tags: auctions, Blockchains, Privacy, Security) @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/atal/DamleFG19, title = {A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders}, author = {Sankarshan Damle and Boi Faltings and Sujit Gujar}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, booktitle = {AAMAS}, pages = {1916--1918}, publisher = {International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, keywords = {auctions, Blockchains, Privacy, Security}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
7. | Sujit Gujar: Blockchain Technology: What is it and What is its future?. In: Manorama Yearbook 2019, Malayala Manorama Press, 2019. (Type: Book Chapter | BibTeX | Tags: Blockchains) @inbook{Gujar2019a, title = {Blockchain Technology: What is it and What is its future?}, author = {Sujit Gujar}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-01-01}, booktitle = {Manorama Yearbook 2019}, publisher = {Malayala Manorama Press}, keywords = {Blockchains}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } |
1. | Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding. 18th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (PRICAI-2021) , Forthcoming. | :
2. | We might walk together, but I run faster: Network Fairness and Scalability in Blockchains. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2021), 2021. | :
3. | Block Rewards, Not Transaction Fees Keep Miners Faithful In Blockchain Protocols. Workshop on Game Theory in Blockchain at WINE 2020 (GTiB@WINE 2020), 2020. | :
4. | Designing Refund Bonus Schemes for Provision Point Mechanism in Civic Crowdfunding. Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW@AAMAS 2020), 2020. | :
5. | Orthos: A Trustworthy AI Framework For Data Acquisition. 8th International Workshop on Engineering Multi-Agent Systems (EMAS 2020), 2020. | :
6. | A Truthful, Privacy-Preserving, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auction For Single-minded Bidders. In: AAMAS, pp. 1916–1918, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019. | :
7. | Blockchain Technology: What is it and What is its future?. In: Manorama Yearbook 2019, Malayala Manorama Press, 2019. | :