2017 |
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13. | Rashi Aswani; Sai Krishna Munnangi; Praveen Paruchuri Improving Surveillance Using Cooperative Target Observation Conference AAAI, pp. 2985–2991, AAAI Press, 2017. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/aaai/AswaniMP17, title = {Improving Surveillance Using Cooperative Target Observation}, author = {Rashi Aswani and Sai Krishna Munnangi and Praveen Paruchuri}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, booktitle = {AAAI}, pages = {2985–2991}, publisher = {AAAI Press}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
12. | Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing Book Chapter Ceppi, Sofia; David, Esther; Hajaj, Chen; Robu, Valentin; Vetsikas, Ioannis A (Ed.): pp. 50–65, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017, ISBN: 978-3-319-54229-4, (Revised Selected Papers from AMEC/TADA 2015). @inbook{10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_4, title = {Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing}, author = {Sujit Gujar and Boi Faltings}, editor = {Sofia Ceppi and Esther David and Chen Hajaj and Valentin Robu and Ioannis A Vetsikas}, isbn = {978-3-319-54229-4}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-01-01}, pages = {50–65}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, address = {Cham}, abstract = {Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal workers for a given set of tasks. However, workers also have preferences and will stay with a platform only if it gives them interesting tasks. We therefore analyze several matching mechanisms that take into account workers’ preferences as well. We propose that the workers pay premiums to get preferred matches and auction-based models where preferences are expressed through variations of the payment for a task. We analyze the properties of two matching different mechanisms: Split Dynamic VCG (SDV) and e-Auction. We compare both the mechanisms with Arrival Priority Serial Dictatorship (APSD) empirically for efficiency.}, note = {Revised Selected Papers from AMEC/TADA 2015}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inbook} } Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and suitable tasks. Earlier work has addressed the problem of finding optimal workers for a given set of tasks. However, workers also have preferences and will stay with a platform only if it gives them interesting tasks. We therefore analyze several matching mechanisms that take into account workers’ preferences as well. We propose that the workers pay premiums to get preferred matches and auction-based models where preferences are expressed through variations of the payment for a task. We analyze the properties of two matching different mechanisms: Split Dynamic VCG (SDV) and e-Auction. We compare both the mechanisms with Arrival Priority Serial Dictatorship (APSD) empirically for efficiency. |
2016 |
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11. | Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing Conference AMEC/TADA, pp. 50–65, Springer, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/amec/GujarF16, title = {Auction Based Mechanisms for Dynamic Task Assignments in Expert Crowdsourcing}, author = {Sujit Gujar and Boi Faltings}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {AMEC/TADA}, volume = {271}, pages = {50–65}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
10. | Shweta Jain; Ganesh Ghalme; Satyanath Bhat; Sujit Gujar; Narahari Y A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments Conference AAMAS, pp. 86–94, ACM, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/atal/JainGBGN16, title = {A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments}, author = {Shweta Jain and Ganesh Ghalme and Satyanath Bhat and Sujit Gujar and Y Narahari}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {AAMAS}, pages = {86–94}, publisher = {ACM}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
9. | Praphul Chandra; Sujit Gujar; Narahari Y Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach Conference ECAI, pp. 778–786, IOS Press, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ecai/ChandraGN16, title = {Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach}, author = {Praphul Chandra and Sujit Gujar and Y Narahari}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {ECAI}, volume = {285}, pages = {778–786}, publisher = {IOS Press}, series = {Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
8. | Online Auctions for Dynamic Assignment: Theory and Empirical Evaluation Conference ECAI, pp. 1035–1043, IOS Press, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ecai/GujarF16, title = {Online Auctions for Dynamic Assignment: Theory and Empirical Evaluation}, author = {Sujit Gujar and Boi Faltings}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {ECAI}, volume = {285}, pages = {1035–1043}, publisher = {IOS Press}, series = {Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
7. | Praphul Chandra; Sujit Gujar; Narahari Y Crowdsourced Referral Auctions Conference ECAI, pp. 1654–1655, IOS Press, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ecai/ChandraGN16a, title = {Crowdsourced Referral Auctions}, author = {Praphul Chandra and Sujit Gujar and Y Narahari}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {ECAI}, volume = {285}, pages = {1654–1655}, publisher = {IOS Press}, series = {Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
6. | Dimitris Chatzopoulos; Sujit Gujar; Boi Faltings; Pan Hui LocalCoin: An ad-hoc payment scheme for areas with high connectivity: poster Conference MobiHoc, pp. 365–366, ACM, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/mobihoc/ChatzopoulosGFH16, title = {LocalCoin: An ad-hoc payment scheme for areas with high connectivity: poster}, author = {Dimitris Chatzopoulos and Sujit Gujar and Boi Faltings and Pan Hui}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {MobiHoc}, pages = {365–366}, publisher = {ACM}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
5. | Akash Agarwal; Praveen Paruchuri Analysis of Lane Level Dynamics for Emergency Vehicle Traversal: (Extended Abstract) Conference AAMAS, pp. 1389–1390, ACM, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/atal/AgarwalP16, title = {Analysis of Lane Level Dynamics for Emergency Vehicle Traversal: (Extended Abstract)}, author = {Akash Agarwal and Praveen Paruchuri}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {AAMAS}, pages = {1389–1390}, publisher = {ACM}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
4. | Gaurav Gupta; Praveen Paruchuri Effect of human behavior on traffic patterns during an emergency Conference ITSC, pp. 2052–2058, IEEE, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/itsc/GuptaP16, title = {Effect of human behavior on traffic patterns during an emergency}, author = {Gaurav Gupta and Praveen Paruchuri}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {ITSC}, pages = {2052–2058}, publisher = {IEEE}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
3. | Akash Agarwal; Praveen Paruchuri V2V communication for analysis of lane level dynamics for better EV traversal Conference Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, pp. 368–375, IEEE, 2016. @inproceedings{DBLP:conf/ivs/AgarwalP16, title = {V2V communication for analysis of lane level dynamics for better EV traversal}, author = {Akash Agarwal and Praveen Paruchuri}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-01}, booktitle = {Intelligent Vehicles Symposium}, pages = {368–375}, publisher = {IEEE}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {inproceedings} } |
2015 |
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2. | Garimella Uma; Praveen Paruchuri (HR)^2: An Agent for Helping HR with Recruitment Journal Article IJATS, 7 (3), pp. 67–85, 2015. @article{DBLP:journals/ijats/UmaP15, title = {(HR)^2: An Agent for Helping HR with Recruitment}, author = {Garimella Uma and Praveen Paruchuri}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-01-01}, journal = {IJATS}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, pages = {67–85}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } |
0000 |
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1. | Sankarshan Damle; Padala Manisha; Sujit Gujar Welfare Optimal Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents Workshop Games, Agents and Incentives Workshop, 0000. @workshop{damle22aoptMCC, title = {Welfare Optimal Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents}, author = {Sankarshan Damle and Padala Manisha and Sujit Gujar}, booktitle = {Games, Agents and Incentives Workshop}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {workshop} } |